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  the	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In	  2009	  the	  Herald	  Sun	  published	  two	  articles	  penned	  by	  staff	  columnist	  Andrew	  Bolt,	  ‘It’s	  so	  
hip	  to	  be	  black’	  and	  ‘White	  fellas	  in	  the	  black’	  (Bolt	  2009a)	  (Bolt	  2009b).	  In	  the	  first	  article	  
published	  on	  April	  15,	  Bolt	  listed	  16	  people	  he	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘the	  white	  face	  of	  a	  new	  black	  
race—the	  political	  Aborigine,’	  inferring	  that	  their	  identification	  as	  Aboriginal	  was	  for	  
financial	  gain	  (Bolt	  2009a).	  In	  August	  2009,	  the	  Herald	  Sun	  published	  Bolt’s	  second	  article	  on	  
the	  same	  theme.	  Bolt	  listed	  seven	  people	  he	  accused	  of	  identifying	  as	  Aboriginal	  for	  
financial	  gain,	  five	  of	  whom	  he	  had	  identified	  in	  the	  original	  article.	  Bolt	  stated	  that	  those	  
individuals	  ‘who,	  out	  of	  their	  multi-­‐stranded	  but	  largely	  European	  genealogy,’	  instead	  
‘decide	  to	  identify	  with	  the	  thinnest	  of	  all	  those	  strands,’	  do	  so	  in	  order	  to	  secure	  ‘special	  
encouragements	  and	  prizes	  we	  set	  aside	  for	  Aborigines’	  (Bolt	  2009b).	  Nine	  of	  the	  people	  
named	  in	  the	  articles,	  activist	  Pat	  Eatock	  ;	  former	  ATSIC	  chairman	  Geoff	  Clark;	  author	  Anita	  
Heiss;	  artist	  Bindi	  Cole;	  health	  worker	  Leeanne	  Enoch;	  academics	  Graham	  Atkinson,	  Wayne	  
Atkinson	  and	  Larissa	  Behrendt;	  and	  lawyer/academic	  Mark	  McMillan,	  issued	  proceedings	  
against	  Bolt	  and	  the	  Herald	  and	  Weekly	  Times	  (HWT)	  under	  section	  18C	  of	  the	  Racial	  
Discrimination	  Act	  (1975).	  Bolt	  and	  HWT	  countered	  with	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  articles	  were	  
written	  in	  good	  faith,	  the	  content	  was	  in	  the	  public	  interest	  and	  under	  the	  provisions	  of	  18D	  
of	  the	  Act,	  were	  fair	  comment.	  The	  hearing	  began	  under	  Justice	  Mordecai	  Bromberg	  on	  
March	  29,	  2011.	  On	  September	  28,	  2011,	  Justice	  Bromberg	  ruled	  in	  favour	  of	  Pat	  Eatock	  and	  
the	  others	  named	  by	  Bolt	  and	  ordered	  the	  Herald	  Sun	  to	  print	  a	  court-­‐worded	  apology.	  Bolt	  
and	  HWT	  chose	  not	  to	  appeal	  the	  decision	  despite	  an	  avalanche	  of	  calls	  to	  do	  so	  from	  
politicians	  and	  commentators	  linking	  the	  outcome	  in	  the	  case	  to	  an	  attack	  on	  free	  speech.	  
On	  October	  5,	  2011,	  the	  Institute	  of	  Public	  Affairs	  ran	  a	  full-­‐page	  advertisement	  in	  The	  
Australian,	  featuring	  650	  names	  presumably	  in	  agreement	  with	  their	  sentiments,	  declaring	  
freedom	  of	  speech	  to	  be	  under	  threat	  in	  Australia	  following	  the	  result	  of	  the	  Bolt	  case,	  and	  
stating:	  ‘It	  is	  alarming	  that	  in	  2011	  someone	  can	  be	  taken	  to	  court	  for	  expressing	  an	  opinion’	  
(2009b).	  The	  constant	  reiteration	  by	  Bolt	  and	  other	  commentators	  aided	  and	  abetted	  by	  
conservative	  politicians	  such	  as	  George	  Brandis	  and	  Tony	  Abbott,	  that	  Justice	  Bromberg’s	  
ruling	  was	  an	  attack	  on	  free	  speech	  obscures	  the	  outcome	  that	  Bolt’s	  original	  comments	  
were	  found	  to	  be	  racist	  according	  to	  the	  Racial	  Discrimination	  Act.	  Further,	  in	  calling	  for	  the	  
repeal	  of	  section	  18C	  of	  the	  Act	  due	  to	  its	  curtailing	  of	  a	  perceived	  freedom	  of	  speech,	  
despite	  Justice	  Bromberg’s	  ruling	  that	  Bolt’s	  two	  articles	  were	  found	  not	  to	  be	  fair	  or	  
accurate	  reports	  or	  fair	  comment,	  the	  implication	  is	  that	  racist	  attacks	  on	  minority	  groups	  
are	  acceptable	  whereas	  attacks	  on	  freedom	  of	  speech	  are	  not.	  
The	  Herald	  Sun’s	  September	  29	  editorial	  defending	  Andrew	  Bolt	  against	  Federal	  Court	  ruling	  
argues	  that	  the	  offending	  columns	  were	  justified.	  In	  the	  second	  paragraph	  the	  editorial	  
‘maintains’	  the	  view	  that:	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What	  Bolt	  wrote	  in	  this	  newspaper	  and	  online	  was	  not	  based	  on	  race,	  but	  on	  the	  way	  
those	  who	  took	  such	  offence	  used	  race	  ('Free	  Speech	  is	  vital	  to	  society'	  	  2011).	  
This	  is	  a	  semantic	  point	  that	  twists	  the	  argument	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  actions	  of	  those	  who	  
claimed	  to	  be	  offended,	  insulted,	  intimidated	  and	  humiliated	  by	  Bolt’s	  comments	  are	  
themselves	  racist.	  In	  the	  fifth	  par	  the	  editorial	  insists	  the	  paper	  was	  right	  to	  publish	  Bolt’s	  
comments:	  
We	  say	  [publication]	  was	  [justifiable]	  and	  if	  it	  is	  the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  law	  that	  
comes	  into	  question,	  then	  it	  is	  the	  law	  that	  should	  be	  changed	  ('Free	  Speech	  is	  vital	  
to	  society'	  	  2011).	  
This	  is	  a	  key	  turning	  point	  in	  the	  argument,	  which	  sets	  up	  the	  HWT	  defence	  that	  the	  
unfettered	  principle	  of	  free	  speech	  must	  trump	  a	  law,	  which	  attempts	  to	  curtail	  it.	  The	  
Australian’s	  legal	  editor	  Chris	  Merritt	  made	  the	  same	  point	  reminding	  us	  that	  if	  his	  News	  
Limited	  bosses	  lose	  their	  legal	  challenge,	  ‘the	  onus	  will	  fall	  to	  the	  government	  –	  or	  its	  
replacement—to	  rebalance	  this	  biased	  law’	  (Merritt	  2011).	  The	  bold	  statement	  here	  is	  that	  
the	  law	  is	  wrong—not	  the	  actions	  of	  Andrew	  Bolt.	  	  
What	  is	  free	  speech	  in	  the	  Bolt	  context?	  
The	  following	  paragraph	  from	  the	  Herald	  Sun’s	  editorial	  of	  29	  September	  defending	  Andrew	  
Bolt	  attempts	  to	  define	  free	  speech	  in	  this	  context:	  
A	  key	  measure	  of	  a	  mature	  society	  is	  the	  ability	  to	  publicly	  discuss	  unpopular	  views	  
without	  fear,	  no	  matter	  how	  distasteful	  they	  are	  to	  some	  of	  us,	  and	  to	  follow	  this	  
discussion	  with	  vigorous	  public	  debate	  ('Free	  Speech	  is	  vital	  to	  society'	  	  2011).	  
But	  this	  case	  was	  not	  about	  tasteful	  or	  distasteful	  comments.	  It	  was	  about	  the	  deliberate	  
denigration	  and	  traducing	  of	  nine	  individuals	  based	  only	  on	  their	  ethnic	  identity.	  	  The	  Herald	  
and	  Weekly	  Times	  justification	  on	  this	  point	  seems	  to	  imply	  that	  anything	  goes	  in	  the	  
freedom	  of	  speech	  stakes.	  Writing	  in	  the	  Herald	  Sun	  the	  day	  after	  the	  Federal	  Court	  
decision,	  senior	  Murdoch	  reporter	  Paul	  Toohey	  wrote	  an	  op-­‐ed	  piece	  attacking	  the	  recently	  
announced	  government	  media	  inquiry.	  The	  same	  free	  speech	  argument	  was	  raised	  in	  the	  
context	  of	  possible	  legislative	  and	  regulatory	  outcomes	  imposed	  by	  government.	  The	  
Murdoch	  press	  in	  Australia	  is	  positioning	  the	  inquiry	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  freedom	  of	  speech,	  
despite	  no	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  this	  is	  the	  government’s	  intention.	  Toohey	  cites	  the	  
American	  situation	  against	  a	  background	  of	  what	  he	  says	  is	  international	  concern	  that	  the	  
government	  might	  intervene	  to	  curtail	  press	  freedom:	  
[W]hile	  American	  press	  freedom	  is	  not	  absolute,	  any	  legislative	  media	  restrictions	  
cannot	  override	  the	  underlying	  rights	  to	  freedom	  of	  expression	  (Toohey	  2011).	  
This	  argument	  takes	  no	  account	  of	  the	  public	  benefit	  and	  public	  interest	  in	  having	  a	  legal	  
means	  to	  curtail	  hateful,	  hurtful	  and	  inflammatory	  propaganda,	  as	  occurred	  in	  the	  Bolt	  case.	  
Any	  society	  that	  wants	  to	  call	  itself	  democratic	  and	  civilized	  will	  have	  legislative	  and	  legal	  
provisions	  preventing	  racist	  speech.	  There	  is	  no	  right	  to	  freedom	  of	  speech	  that	  involves	  
racial	  or	  other	  defamation	  based	  on	  stereotyping,	  misconceptions,	  or	  deliberately	  deceptive	  
arguments.	  There	  is	  no	  right	  to	  free	  speech	  if	  the	  aim	  of	  that	  speech	  is	  to	  encourage	  others	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to	  action—even	  if	  that	  action	  (at	  this	  point)	  is	  merely	  an	  invitation	  to	  share	  such	  views.	  On	  
this	  point	  the	  Herald	  Sun	  editorial	  spins	  itself	  a	  very	  tight	  web,	  but	  unfortunately	  it	  appears	  
caught	  in	  the	  clever	  strands	  of	  its	  own	  faulty	  logic:	  
This	  has	  very	  much	  been	  a	  trial	  of	  freedom	  of	  speech	  [sic].	  Those	  who	  complained	  
had	  the	  opportunity	  to	  put	  forward	  their	  own	  views.	  They	  were	  offered	  equal	  space	  
on	  these	  pages,	  but	  sought	  to	  silence	  Bolt	  on	  the	  subject	  of	  the	  social	  consequences	  
of	  their	  choice	  to	  identify	  as	  Aboriginal	  ('Free	  Speech	  is	  vital	  to	  society'	  	  2011).	  
We	  cannot,	  at	  this	  point,	  offer	  an	  opinion	  on	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  complainants	  were	  offered	  
and	  refused	  a	  chance	  to	  respond	  in	  the	  paper.	  However,	  we	  observe	  that	  this	  would	  not	  
necessarily	  have	  been	  in	  the	  plaintiff’s	  best	  interests.	  The	  only	  possible	  outcome	  would	  be	  
to	  add	  fuel	  to	  the	  fire	  Bolt	  was	  attempting	  to	  ignite	  with	  an	  explosion	  of	  feigned	  moral	  
outrage.	  If	  we	  had	  been	  advising	  the	  nine	  our	  recommendation	  would	  have	  been	  not	  to	  
engage	  with	  Bolt	  in	  the	  pages	  of	  his	  own	  newspaper.	  Bolt	  has	  previous	  form	  in	  these	  
matters	  and	  he	  would	  know	  that	  anything	  the	  accused	  put	  forward	  in	  their	  defence	  would	  
be	  used	  to	  further	  inflame	  the	  mob	  rule	  atmosphere	  that	  demagogues	  thrive	  in.	  But	  on	  the	  
last	  line,	  ‘the	  social	  consequences	  of	  their	  choice	  to	  identify	  as	  Aboriginal,’	  we	  can	  surmise	  
that	  the	  irony	  of	  this	  comment	  is	  lost	  on	  the	  editorialist	  ('Free	  Speech	  is	  vital	  to	  society'	  	  
2011).	  One	  of	  the	  social	  consequences	  the	  plaintiffs	  had	  to	  endure	  was	  the	  vilification	  and	  
opprobrium	  heaped	  on	  them	  by	  Andrew	  Bolt	  in	  his	  offending	  columns	  and	  by	  his	  legion	  of	  
ill-­‐informed	  fans	  who	  lap	  up	  his	  diatribes.	  
Linking	  the	  ‘Bolt	  principle’	  to	  ‘illiberal’	  attacks	  on	  the	  free	  speech	  
That	  Paul	  Toohey’s	  29	  September	  Herald	  Sun	  column	  arguing	  against	  the	  government’s	  
media	  inquiry	  appeared	  on	  the	  same	  page	  as	  the	  pro-­‐Bolt	  editorial	  and	  a	  long	  piece	  by	  Bolt	  
himself,	  is	  no	  coincidence.	  	  
On	  29	  September,	  The	  Australian’s	  legal	  editor	  Chris	  Merritt	  wrote	  a	  comment	  piece,	  ‘A	  
biased	  principle	  threatens	  the	  nation’,	  criticising	  the	  Federal	  Court	  decision	  in	  the	  Bolt	  case	  
(Merritt	  2011).	  He	  even	  names	  it	  ‘The	  court’s	  “Bolt	  principle”’	  and	  argues	  it	  will	  turn	  
Australia	  into	  ‘a	  nation	  of	  tribes…protected	  species	  too	  fragile	  to	  cope	  with	  robust	  public	  
discourse’	  (Merritt	  2011).	  Merritt	  labels	  Judge	  Bromberg’s	  decision	  ‘patronising’	  toward	  
Aboriginal	  people	  and	  warns	  it	  will	  ‘divide	  the	  nation’	  (Merritt	  2011).	  The	  flaw	  in	  the	  ruling	  is	  
that	  the	  judge—in	  Merritt’s	  view—operated	  as	  ‘a	  kind	  of	  uber-­‐editor’	  who	  took	  it	  upon	  
himself	  to	  rule	  out	  words	  ‘he	  did	  not	  like,’	  in	  effect,	  trying	  to	  tell	  Andrew	  Bolt	  how	  to	  write	  
his	  column	  (Merritt	  2011).	  He	  concludes:	  ‘It	  was	  almost	  funny’	  (Merritt	  2011).	  Merritt’s	  
punchline	  is	  hard	  to	  miss:	  ‘how	  easily	  the	  Racial	  Discrimination	  Act	  can	  silence	  unpopular	  
opinion’	  (Merritt	  2011).	  Merritt	  suggests,	  without	  any	  evidence,	  that	  this	  new	  power	  will	  
‘have	  a	  pernicious	  effect’	  on	  public	  debate	  ‘on	  the	  issue	  of	  race’	  (Merritt	  2011).	  Fortunately,	  
we	  are	  given	  a	  fearful	  example	  of	  how	  this	  ‘pernicious	  effect’	  might	  operate	  on	  Australian	  
the	  psyche:	  
It	  will	  encourage	  people	  to	  see	  themselves	  not	  as	  Australians	  but	  as	  separate	  racial	  
groups.	  By	  thinking	  in	  such	  racist	  terms,	  they	  will	  have	  the	  advantage	  of	  a	  law	  that	  is	  
ridiculously	  skewed	  in	  their	  favour	  (Merritt	  2011).	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There’s	  a	  lot	  wrong	  with	  this	  statement;	  a	  key	  issue	  is	  the	  essentialised	  idea	  of	  ‘race’	  at	  the	  
core.	  Other	  Murdoch	  commentators	  have	  made	  similar	  arguments	  that	  touch	  on	  the	  issue	  
of	  separatism	  in	  multicultural	  society.	  In	  this	  instance	  Merritt	  appears	  to	  be	  suggesting	  that	  
the	  Federal	  Court	  decision	  will	  somehow	  make	  it	  easier	  for	  groups	  arguing	  for	  a	  racially	  
separatist	  approach	  in	  Australia	  to	  stop	  opponents	  from	  criticising	  them:	  
Such	  people,	  if	  indeed	  they	  exist,	  will	  then	  be	  able	  to	  use	  the	  ‘Bolt	  principle’	  to	  
silence	  their	  critics	  ‘using	  a	  procedure	  [Bromberg’s	  ruling]	  that	  is	  almost	  guaranteed	  
to	  favour	  racial	  groups	  claiming	  to	  be	  offended’	  (Merritt	  2011).	  
The	  language	  in	  these	  passages	  from	  Merritt	  is	  vague,	  but	  on	  closer	  reading	  the	  words	  
reveal	  a	  subtle	  coding.	  Judge	  Bromberg	  erred	  by	  not	  using	  ‘community	  standards’	  as	  the	  
‘critical	  threshold	  test’.	  His	  favoured	  method,	  to	  question	  Bolt’s	  statements	  ‘from	  the	  
perspective	  of	  a	  hypothetical	  representative	  of	  those	  claiming	  to	  be	  offended’,	  is	  wrong	  in	  
Merritt’s	  opinion	  (Merritt	  2011).	  But	  how	  does	  this	  reconcile	  with	  Bolt’s	  comments	  being	  
‘unpopular	  opinion’	  as	  suggested	  in	  several	  Murdoch	  paper	  editorials	  and	  by	  Merritt	  
himself?	  If	  Merritt	  believes	  Bolt’s	  columns	  would	  not	  have	  offended	  ‘community	  standards’	  
they	  must,	  almost	  by	  definition,	  be	  at	  least	  somewhat	  popular.	  By	  acknowledging	  they	  are	  
‘unpopular’	  the	  Murdoch	  stable	  of	  writers	  is	  establishing	  that	  popular	  taste	  is	  not	  dictated	  
by	  ordinary	  Australians	  but	  by	  an	  elite	  that	  includes	  the	  ‘political’	  and	  ‘professional’	  
Aborigines,	  some	  members	  of	  the	  judiciary	  and	  their	  supporters	  in	  the	  chattering	  classes	  
and	  liberal	  commentariat.	  This	  appeal	  to	  populism	  is	  common	  among	  conservative	  
commentators	  worldwide.	  It	  is	  a	  theme	  taken	  up	  with	  some	  gusto	  by	  News	  Limited	  
columnist	  and	  blogger	  Miranda	  Devine:	  
The	  Federal	  Court	  has	  shown	  us	  that	  the	  Racial	  Discrimination	  Act	  can	  be	  used	  to	  
silence	  unfashionable	  opinion	  (Devine	  2011).	  
What	  Justice	  Bromberg	  found	  in	  the	  case	  against	  Bolt	  was	  not	  just	  unfashionable	  opinion	  
but	  two	  ‘inflammatory	  and	  provocative’	  articles	  where	  ‘the	  use	  of	  mockery	  and	  derision	  was	  
extensive’	  (Bromberg	  2011).	  Bromberg	  stated	  that:	  
There	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  the	  newspaper	  articles	  were	  designed	  to	  sting	  the	  people	  in	  
the	  “trend”	  and	  in	  particular	  those	  identified	  therein.	  The	  language	  was	  not	  simply	  
colourful	  …	  It	  was	  language	  …	  intended	  to	  confront	  those	  that	  he	  accused	  with	  “the	  
consequences	  of	  their	  actions”	  and	  done	  with	  the	  expectation	  that	  they	  would	  be	  
both	  “offended”	  and	  “upset”	  and	  in	  the	  hope	  that	  they	  would	  be	  “remorseful”	  (the	  
words	  quoted	  are	  Mr	  Bolt’s)	  (Bromberg	  2011).	  
But,	  as	  Devine	  warns,	  ‘make	  no	  mistake’	  there	  is	  a	  conspiracy	  under	  way	  to	  silence	  those	  
who	  dare	  to	  speak	  out	  against	  political	  correctness:	  
[T]he	  swarm	  of	  Left-­‐wing	  lawyers	  who	  have	  urged	  it	  on,	  acting	  pro	  bono	  or	  
commenting	  approvingly	  from	  the	  sidelines,	  are	  all	  part	  of	  an	  illiberal	  movement	  in	  
Australia	  to	  crush	  dissent	  (Devine	  2011).	  
There	  is	  no	  evidence	  for	  this	  claim,	  nor	  for	  the	  ludicrous	  idea	  that	  Andrew	  Bolt	  is	  somehow	  a	  
dissenter;	  but	  it	  is	  a	  consistent	  thread	  in	  the	  Murdoch	  press	  oeuvre	  on	  this	  issue.	  What’s	  
missing	  from	  this	  one-­‐sided	  fusillade	  of	  misdirected	  potshots	  and	  crazed	  sniper	  fire	  is	  any	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attempt	  to	  address	  issues	  of	  power.	  Bolt,	  Devine,	  Merritt	  and	  the	  other	  hacks	  in	  the	  
Murdoch	  stable	  have	  almost	  unlimited	  resources	  to	  traduce	  their	  straw	  man	  enemies	  as	  
confirmed	  by	  News	  Limited	  CEO,	  John	  Hartigan:	  
[W]e	  have	  around	  140	  newspapers	  in	  Australia.	  That	  includes	  one	  national	  
broadsheet,	  15	  daily	  and	  Sunday	  metropolitan	  newspapers,	  107	  community	  titles	  &	  
21	  regional	  newspapers.	  We’ve	  also	  got	  27	  magazines	  in	  our	  stable,	  from	  Vogue	  to	  
Golfing	  Digest.	  We	  run	  over	  100	  websites	  and	  now	  have	  iPad	  applications	  for	  five	  
mastheads.	  7	  in	  every	  10	  Australians	  read	  a	  News	  Limited	  newspaper	  or	  visit	  one	  of	  
our	  websites	  every	  week.	  Our	  national	  and	  metro	  mastheads	  are	  read	  by	  over	  8.6	  
million	  Australians	  each	  week	  …	  I’m	  giving	  you	  these	  figures	  not	  to	  boast	  but	  
because	  understanding	  our	  reach	  is	  key	  (Hartigan	  2011).	  
Bolt,	  in	  particular,	  has	  extraordinary	  reach,	  writing	  two	  columns	  per	  week	  for	  the	  Herald	  Sun	  
which	  are	  then	  syndicated	  via	  News	  Limited	  newspapers	  throughout	  Australia,	  writing	  his	  
own	  Bolt	  Blog	  posted	  seven	  days	  per	  week	  on	  the	  Herald	  Sun	  website,	  hosting	  his	  own	  
Sunday	  morning	  television	  commentary	  program,	  the	  Bolt	  Report,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  regular	  
morning	  spot	  on	  a	  Melbourne	  talkback	  radio	  program.	  There	  can	  be	  no	  doubt	  Andrew	  Bolt	  
is	  an	  influential	  asset	  supporting	  Murdoch’s	  political	  reach	  into	  Australian	  society.	  
Mainstreaming	  Racism	  
Paul	  Kelly	  writing	  in	  The	  Australian	  blamed	  the	  federal	  government	  for	  being	  out	  of	  touch	  
with	  ‘mainstream	  values’	  and	  for	  refusing	  to	  ‘condemn	  the	  stifling	  of	  debate’	  (Kelly	  2011).	  	  
Indeed,	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  find	  a	  more	  perfect	  example	  of	  the	  trap	  of	  political	  correctness	  
and	  the	  legal-­‐human	  rights	  culture	  of	  legislating	  for	  good	  behaviour	  than	  this	  
application	  of	  the	  Racial	  Discrimination	  Act	  …	  when	  will	  Labor	  get	  some	  mainstream	  
common	  sense	  into	  its	  values?	  (Kelly	  2011).	  
James	  Allan	  reiterated	  Kelly’s	  call	  for	  an	  endorsement	  of	  mainstream	  values,	  declaring	  ‘that	  
most	  Australians	  are	  on	  the	  side	  of	  more	  free	  speech,	  at	  least	  outside	  the	  Green-­‐voting	  
inner-­‐city	  suburbs’	  (Allan	  2011).	  	  
Enforced	  hate-­‐speech	  laws.	  Ridiculous	  talk	  of	  new	  privacy	  laws	  …	  and	  that	  Green	  
party-­‐driven	  media	  inquiry	  …	  we	  are	  not	  heading	  in	  the	  right	  direction	  on	  free	  
speech	  in	  this	  country.	  And	  it’s	  up	  to	  us	  to	  make	  our	  dislike	  of	  the	  malevolent	  
direction	  plain	  (Allan	  2011).	  
Journalists	  often	  claim	  a	  denial	  of	  any	  underlying	  intent	  and	  trivialise	  any	  effect	  of	  racist	  
writing	  on	  recipients.	  In	  a	  piece	  in	  The	  Australian	  four	  days	  after	  Justice	  Bromberg’s	  ruling,	  
Bolt	  not	  only	  disputed	  the	  ruling	  but	  reversed	  it	  by	  stating:	  ‘I	  am	  not	  a	  racist,	  my	  message	  
was	  anti-­‐racist	  and	  my	  message	  has	  always	  been	  consistent’	  (Allan	  2011).	  Fellow	  News	  
Limited	  columnist	  Brendan	  O’Neill,	  while	  lamenting	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  new	  paradigm	  of	  
‘censure	  and	  censorship,’	  provided	  an	  example	  of	  the	  trivialisation	  of	  the	  effect	  of	  Bolt’s	  
columns	  on	  their	  subjects:	  	  
The	  terrifying	  thing	  that	  this	  ruling	  codifies	  is	  the	  idea	  that	  people’s	  feelings	  are	  more	  
important	  than	  free	  speech…	  In	  short,	  the	  case	  confirms	  the	  modern-­‐day	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sanctification	  of	  the	  Offended	  Minority,	  whose	  personal	  and	  emotional	  interests	  
must	  override	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  rest	  of	  us’	  (O'Neill	  2011).	  
A	  similar	  line	  was	  taken	  in	  a	  piece	  in	  The	  Weekend	  Australian.	  ‘They,’	  meaning	  other	  than	  
the	  stereotypical	  ‘noble	  savage’	  in	  need	  of	  protection:	  
…	  push	  the	  abstract	  rights	  agenda	  of	  educated,	  urban	  Aborigines	  over	  the	  housing	  
and	  education	  needs	  of	  indigenous	  Australians	  in	  remote	  and	  regional	  communities	  
…	  most	  Australians	  …	  are	  sympathetic	  to	  indigenous	  disadvantage	  but	  troubled	  by	  
affirmative	  action	  for	  educated,	  urban	  Aborigines	  ('Wisdom	  resides	  in	  the	  votes	  of	  all	  
people'	  	  2011).	  
The	  repeated	  accusation	  of	  priviledge	  for	  	  ‘urban	  Aborigines,’	  reflects	  an	  accepted	  division	  
of	  indigenous	  ‘place’	  in	  Australia,	  and	  reveals	  the	  supposed	  transgression	  of	  this	  group.	  As	  
Jon	  Stratton	  states:	  	  
”Australian”	  settlement	  has	  traditionally	  located	  itself	  in	  a	  factual	  history	  of	  white	  
settlement	  occurring	  from	  the	  south-­‐east	  of	  the	  continent.	  The	  north	  of	  the	  
continent	  has	  been	  constructed	  as	  the	  site	  of	  the	  Other,	  of	  that	  which	  has	  been	  
repressed	  in	  the	  south’s	  production	  of	  the	  real	  (Stratton	  1989).	  
Critical	  discourse	  analyst,	  Teun	  van	  Dijk,	  has	  been	  mapping	  the	  discursive	  reproduction	  of	  
racism	  in	  the	  media	  in	  an	  ongoing	  project	  from	  the	  early	  1980s.	  ‘Elites,’	  van	  Dijk	  states,	  of	  
which	  the	  media	  is	  one	  body,	  ‘initiate,	  monitor,	  and	  control	  the	  majority	  and	  most	  
influential	  forms	  of	  institutional	  and	  public	  text	  and	  talk	  …	  may	  set	  or	  change	  the	  agenda	  of	  
public	  discourse	  and	  opinion	  making’	  (Van	  Dijk	  1995:	  4).	  Cultural	  theorist	  Stuart	  Hall	  
believes	  the	  media	  ‘classify	  …	  the	  world	  in	  terms	  of	  race’	  by	  constructing	  	  ‘a	  definition	  of	  
what	  race	  is,	  what	  meaning	  the	  imagery	  of	  race	  carries,	  and	  what	  the	  “problem	  of	  race”	  is	  
understood	  to	  be’	  (Hall	  1981:	  37).	  In	  addition,	  the	  media	  ‘are	  not	  only	  a	  powerful	  source	  of	  
ideas	  about	  race.	  They	  are	  also	  one	  place	  where	  these	  ideas	  are	  articulated,	  worked	  on,	  
transformed	  and	  elaborated’	  (Hall	  1981:	  37).	  
In	  the	  reproduction	  of	  racism	  in	  the	  media,	  where	  social	  norms	  generally	  prohibit	  explicit	  
discrimination,	  elite	  discourse	  ‘expresses,	  persuasively	  conveys	  and	  legitimates	  ethnic	  or	  
racial	  stereotypes	  and	  prejudices	  among	  white	  group	  members,	  and	  may	  thus	  form	  or	  
confirm	  the	  social	  cognitions	  of	  other	  whites’	  (Van	  Dijk	  1993:	  179).	  Van	  Dijk	  identifies	  
strategies	  of	  defence	  and	  positive	  self-­‐presentation	  that	  are	  used	  against	  allegations	  of	  
outright	  racism.	  Journalists	  may	  deny	  that	  they	  made	  incriminating	  statements	  or	  that	  there	  
was	  any	  ‘underlying	  intentions,	  purposes,	  or	  attitudes’	  by	  stating	  “I	  did	  not	  do/say	  that”,	  “I	  
did	  not	  do/say	  that	  on	  purpose”,	  “That	  is	  not	  what	  I	  meant”,	  “You	  got	  me	  wrong”	  (Van	  Dijk	  
1993:	  180).	  	  In	  addition,	  accusations	  about	  biased	  news	  reports	  about	  minorities	  are	  
dismissed	  by	  denying	  any	  responsibility	  for	  prejudicial	  attitudes	  these	  reports	  may	  generate	  
in	  their	  audience	  through	  a	  claim	  to	  truth:	  ‘Telling	  the	  truth’	  may	  thus	  be	  the	  typical	  
euphemism	  of	  those	  accused	  of	  saying	  or	  writing	  derogatory	  things	  about	  minorities’	  (Van	  
Dijk	  1993:	  180).	  
The	  consensus	  seems	  to	  be,	  for	  most	  journalists,	  that	  any	  form	  of	  media	  censorship,	  by	  way	  
of	  legal	  constraints	  such	  as	  the	  Racial	  Discrimination	  Act,	  ‘must	  be	  broken	  in	  order	  to	  tell	  the	  
“truth”	  [even	  though]	  to	  “state	  the	  truth”,	  meaning	  “to	  say	  negative	  things	  about	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minorities”,	  may	  well	  be	  against	  the	  prevalent	  norms	  of	  tolerance	  and	  understanding’	  (Van	  
Dijk	  1993:	  183-­‐4).	  This	  denial	  of	  racism	  through	  asserting	  that	  the	  writer	  is	  only	  conveying	  
the	  truth	  as	  he	  or	  she	  sees	  it	  and	  must	  be	  able	  to	  convey	  their	  version	  of	  the	  truth	  to	  the	  
public:	  	  
…	  presupposes	  that	  the	  journalist	  or	  columnist	  believes	  that	  his	  or	  her	  own	  group	  or	  
country	  is	  essentially	  ‘tolerant’	  towards	  minorities	  or	  immigrants.	  Positive	  self-­‐
presentation	  …	  in	  journalistic	  discourse	  …	  should	  be	  seen	  as	  the	  argumentative	  
denial	  of	  the	  accusations	  of	  anti-­‐racists	  (Van	  Dijk	  1993:	  183).	  
As	  Marcia	  Langton	  in	  the	  Sunday	  Age	  noted	  ‘the	  presumption	  is	  that	  “white	  people”	  …	  are	  
not	  members	  of	  a	  race	  but	  normal’	  (Langton	  2011).	  	  
Journalists	  denials	  and	  disclaimers	  are	  often	  ‘intended	  as	  an	  exculpatory	  device	  …	  rather	  
than	  a	  genuine	  attempt	  to	  counter	  …	  contrary	  messages’	  as	  was	  pointed	  out	  by	  Justice	  
Bromberg	  highlighting	  the	  disingenuousness	  of	  a	  disclaiming	  paragraph	  inserted	  into	  the	  
middle	  of	  Bolt’s	  first	  article	  (Bromberg	  2011).	  Bolt	  wrote:	  
I’m	  not	  saying	  any	  of	  those	  I’ve	  named	  chose	  to	  be	  Aboriginal	  for	  anything	  but	  the	  
most	  heartfelt	  and	  honest	  of	  reasons.	  I	  certainly	  don’t	  accuse	  them	  of	  opportunism,	  
even	  if	  full-­‐blooded	  Aborigines	  may	  wonder	  how	  such	  fair	  people	  can	  claim	  to	  be	  
one	  of	  them	  and	  in	  some	  cases	  take	  black	  jobs	  (Bolt	  2009a).	  
Stella	  Coram,	  in	  a	  posting	  on	  the	  internet	  forum,	  The	  Conversation,	  considers	  that	  Bolt’s	  
proviso	  exposes	  his	  failure	  in	  understanding:	  	  
Bolt	  reveals	  his	  cynicism	  in	  the	  contentious	  belief	  that	  people	  who	  are	  essentially	  
white	  choose	  to	  identify	  as	  Aboriginal	  …	  are	  profiting	  from	  claiming	  to	  be	  Aboriginal	  
…	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  Bolt	  fails	  to	  see	  his	  own	  unearned	  privilege	  traditionally	  
associated	  with	  being	  ‘white’	  (Coram	  on	  Jakubowicz	  2011).	  
Symbolic	  Racism:	  Who	  gets	  to	  define	  Aboriginality?	  
Justice	  Bromberg,	  in	  ruling	  against	  Bolt,	  found	  that	  each	  of	  the	  nine	  individuals	  who	  gave	  
evidence	  in	  the	  Federal	  Court	  was	  ‘entitled	  to	  regard	  themselves	  and	  be	  regarded	  by	  others	  
as	  an	  Aboriginal	  person,’	  and	  went	  on	  to	  state:	  
I	  have	  taken	  into	  account	  the	  possible	  degree	  of	  harm	  that	  …	  the	  conduct	  involved	  
may	  have	  caused	  …	  I	  have	  also	  found	  that	  the	  conduct	  was	  reasonably	  likely	  to	  have	  
an	  intimidatory	  effect	  on	  …	  fair-­‐skinned	  Aboriginal	  people	  and	  in	  particular	  young	  
Aboriginal	  persons	  or	  others	  with	  vulnerability	  in	  relation	  to	  their	  identity	  …	  and	  …	  
the	  articles	  may	  have	  been	  read	  by	  some	  people	  susceptible	  to	  racial	  stereotyping	  
and	  the	  formation	  of	  racially	  prejudicial	  views	  and	  that	  …	  racially	  prejudiced	  views	  
have	  been	  reinforced,	  encouraged	  or	  emboldened	  (Bromberg	  2011).	  
A	  2003	  government	  briefing	  paper,	  ‘Defining	  Aboriginality	  in	  Australia,’	  recounts	  an	  episode	  
of	  symbolic	  racism	  that	  occurred	  in	  1988	  at	  the	  RSL	  national	  conference.	  Victorian	  state	  
president	  Bruce	  Ruxton	  called	  for	  an	  amendment	  to	  ‘the	  definition	  of	  Aborigine	  to	  eliminate	  
the	  part-­‐whites	  who	  are	  making	  a	  racket	  out	  of	  being	  so-­‐called	  Aborigines	  at	  enormous	  cost	  
to	  the	  taxpayers’	  (Slee	  1988).	  National	  president,	  Brigadier	  Alf	  Garland	  called	  for	  an	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examination	  to	  verify	  whether	  an	  Aboriginal	  could	  claim	  to	  be	  ‘a	  full-­‐blood	  or	  a	  half-­‐caste	  or	  
a	  quarter-­‐caste	  or	  whatever’	  in	  determining	  eligibility	  for	  government	  assistance	  (Slee	  
1988).	  On	  the	  front	  page	  of	  the	  Herald	  Sun	  the	  day	  after	  Justice	  Bromberg	  handed	  down	  his	  
ruling,	  Bolt,	  echoing	  the	  former	  assimilationist	  and	  integrationist	  policies	  discarded	  during	  
the	  1970s,	  questioned	  the	  right	  individuals	  have	  to	  identify	  as	  indigenous	  Australians,	  
stating	  that	  he	  ‘cannot	  be	  the	  only	  Australian	  to	  wonder	  why	  fair	  people	  with	  European	  
ancestry	  insist	  they	  are	  Aboriginal	  only’	  (Bolt	  2011).	  In	  a	  ricochet	  of	  the	  sentiments	  of	  
Ruxton	  and	  Garland,	  this	  theme	  reverberated	  in	  the	  media	  in	  the	  following	  days:	  	  
What	  determines	  who	  is	  an	  Aborigine?	  Does	  one's	  Aboriginal	  great-­‐great-­‐
grandparent	  qualify	  them	  to	  apply	  for	  special	  entitlements,	  particularly	  when	  they	  
have	  a	  job,	  a	  good	  home	  and	  living	  standards	  similar	  to	  mainstream	  Australia?	  …	  I	  
don't	  think	  Justice	  Bromberg	  realised	  he	  had	  opened	  a	  Pandora's	  box	  when	  he	  made	  
his	  recent	  findings	  …	  the	  goodwill	  that	  has	  continued	  since	  the	  1967	  referendum	  will	  
gradually	  disappear,	  and	  that	  would	  be	  a	  tragedy	  for	  all	  of	  us	  but	  particularly	  for	  the	  
Aboriginal	  community	  (Cohen	  2011).	  	  
	  Under	  the	  headline,	  ‘Why	  can’t	  I	  be	  free	  to	  speak?’	  Bolt	  declared:	  
I	  believe	  we	  can	  choose	  or	  even	  renounce	  our	  ethnic	  identity,	  because	  I	  have	  done	  
that	  myself.	  But	  I	  also	  believe	  that	  many	  people	  now	  increasingly	  do	  insist	  on	  
asserting	  racial	  and	  ethnic	  identities,	  and	  that	  we	  increasingly	  spend	  money	  and	  pass	  
laws	  to	  entrench	  them	  …	  I	  wrote	  about	  people	  who,	  it	  seemed	  to	  me,	  had	  other	  
options	  than	  to	  call	  themselves	  …	  “Aboriginal”	  …	  They	  could	  choose	  to	  identify	  as	  
Aboriginal,	  or	  as	  some	  other	  ethnicity	  in	  their	  ancestry,	  or,	  as	  I	  do,	  as	  Australian	  (Bolt	  
2011).	  
What	  is	  Bolt	  saying	  here?	  That	  those	  people	  who	  identify	  as	  Aborigine,	  and	  are	  therefore,	  
indigenous	  to	  Australia	  sharing	  a	  culture	  that	  can	  be	  traced	  back	  60.000	  years,	  are	  not	  
Australian?	  He	  appears	  to	  be	  suggesting	  that	  if	  an	  Aboriginal	  person	  in	  Australia	  today	  is	  not	  
living	  in	  the	  ‘outback’,	  dispossessed	  and	  marginalised	  then	  they	  have	  not	  right	  be	  call	  
themselves	  an	  Aborigine.	  Even	  worse,	  the	  implication	  is	  that	  if	  your	  skin	  is	  not	  dark	  enough	  
then	  you	  should	  not	  call	  yourself	  an	  indigenous	  person	  today.	  This	  is	  dangerous	  ground	  for	  a	  
modern	  public	  intellectual	  to	  take;	  it	  skates	  very	  close	  to	  a	  discredited	  eugenics	  view	  of	  race	  
and	  ethnicity.	  But	  Bolt’s	  purpose	  is	  not	  to	  open	  up	  debate,	  but	  rather	  to	  drive	  a	  racial	  wedge	  
into	  Australian	  public	  life.	  	  
Each	  of	  the	  people	  singled	  out	  by	  Bolt,	  besides	  identifying	  as	  Aboriginal,	  are	  recognised	  in	  
their	  respective	  fields	  for	  their	  achievement	  and	  excellence.	  	  As	  Langton	  observed,	  this	  ‘is	  
also	  Bolt's	  gripe.	  His	  columns	  twisted	  their	  achievement	  into	  something	  sinister	  and	  
underhanded’	  (Langton	  2011).	  Bolt,	  having	  constructed	  an	  image	  of	  indigenous	  Australians	  
as	  not	  ‘fair-­‐skinned,’	  creates	  further	  doubt	  about	  the	  complainants’	  aboriginality	  by	  avowing	  
that	  it	  is	  a	  choice	  they	  have	  made.	  This	  ‘signalling	  [of]	  journalistic	  doubt	  and	  distance’	  is	  a	  
device	  employed	  to	  rebound	  an	  accusation	  of	  racism	  back	  onto	  the	  victim	  (Van	  Dijk	  1993:	  
186).	  Bolt’s	  plea	  to	  identify	  allegiance	  to	  ‘white	  group	  solidarity’	  coupled	  with	  strategies	  of	  
denial	  of	  racism,	  van	  Dijk	  asserts,	  have	  a	  socio-­‐political	  function,	  delegitimising	  the	  need	  for	  
measures	  to	  combat	  racist	  attitudes.	  Van	  Dijk	  states	  that	  denials	  ‘challenge	  the	  very	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legitimacy	  of	  anti-­‐racist	  analysis	  …	  as	  long	  as	  a	  problem	  is	  being	  denied	  in	  the	  first	  place,	  the	  
critics	  are	  ridiculed,	  marginalised	  or	  delegitimated’	  (Van	  Dijk	  1993:	  181).	  	  
The	  definition	  of	  Aboriginality	  in	  Australia	  has	  a	  legacy	  of	  a	  hard-­‐fought,	  often	  contentious	  
struggle	  for	  recognition	  that	  reveals	  its	  grounding	  in	  historic	  colonial	  racism.	  From	  the	  1830s	  
to	  the	  1950s,	  aboriginality	  was	  defined	  according	  to	  ‘Blood-­‐quotum’	  classification;	  from	  the	  
1960s	  to	  the	  1970s,	  definitions	  of	  race	  came	  into	  play,	  and	  by	  the	  1980s	  what	  came	  to	  be	  
known	  as	  the	  ‘Three-­‐part	  Definition’	  was	  adopted	  which	  defined	  an	  Aboriginal	  as:	  
…	  a	  Person	  who:	  (a)	  is	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Aboriginal	  race	  of	  Australia,	  (b)	  identifies	  as	  
an	  Aboriginal,	  and	  (c)	  is	  accepted	  by	  the	  Aboriginal	  community	  as	  an	  Aboriginal	  
(Gardiner-­‐Garden	  2003:	  4).	  
In	  a	  landmark	  paper,	  ‘The	  legal	  classification	  of	  race	  in	  Australia’	  published	  in	  1986,	  John	  
McCorquodale	  analysed	  over	  700	  pieces	  of	  legislation	  and	  identifies	  67	  ‘classifications,	  
descriptions	  or	  definitions’	  relating	  to	  Aboriginality,	  wryly	  noting	  that	  there	  were	  no	  
equivalent	  definitions	  of	  ‘European’	  (McCorquodale	  1986:	  9-­‐11)	  McCorquodale	  concluded	  
that	  indigenous	  Australians	  had	  been	  ‘singled	  out	  for	  …	  an	  extraordinarily	  diverse	  range	  of	  
legislation	  …	  simply	  upon	  grounds	  of	  presumed	  racial	  superiority’	  (McCorquodale	  1986:	  8).	  
A	  new	  species	  of	  legal	  creature	  was	  created	  and	  sustained	  as	  a	  separate	  class,	  
subject	  to	  separate	  laws,	  separately	  administered.	  This	  form	  of	  legal	  apartheid	  
preceded	  that	  of	  South	  Africa	  by	  more	  than	  two	  generations	  and	  continued	  on	  a	  
different,	  but	  parallel	  course,	  for	  another	  three	  …	  The	  unequal	  provision	  and	  
treatment	  of	  law	  …	  mocked	  the	  notion	  of	  equality;	  when	  considered	  in	  the	  absence	  
of	  any	  comparable	  law	  for	  “whites”,	  or	  even	  other	  “colours”	  (McCorquodale	  1986:	  
15-­‐16).	  	  
McCorquodale	  cites	  a	  West	  Australian	  case	  Spitz	  vs.	  Eades,	  1971	  which,	  he	  states,	  illustrates	  
‘the	  worst	  aspects	  of	  legislative	  racism,	  assertions	  of	  apartheid,	  negative	  stereotypes,	  and	  
the	  equation	  of	  “white”	  with	  “civilized,”’	  where	  the	  Court	  ruled	  that	  to	  establish	  
Aboriginality	  a	  person	  had	  to	  live’	  as	  ‘an	  Aboriginal	  native’	  requiring	  ‘proof	  of	  a	  nomadic	  life-­‐
style’:	  
A	  person	  could	  not	  be	  held	  to	  be	  living	  as	  ‘an	  aboriginal	  native’	  when	  it	  was	  shown	  
by	  evidence	  that	  he	  was	  living	  in	  a	  house	  situated	  amongst	  those	  occupied	  by	  
“white”	  citizens	  of	  Australia,	  and	  was	  generally	  in	  regular	  employment	  and	  had	  been	  
so	  during	  the	  previous	  five	  years,	  owned	  his	  own	  car,	  travelled	  to	  Perth	  three	  times	  a	  
year	  to	  visit	  friends	  and	  relatives,	  conducted	  himself	  acceptable	  to	  responsible	  
citizens	  of	  his	  area,	  dressed	  well,	  and	  was	  able	  satisfactorily	  to	  speak	  the	  English	  
language’	  (McCorquodale	  1986:	  17).	  	  
In	  1966,	  South	  Australia	  introduced	  the	  first	  anti-­‐discrimination	  laws.	  Tasmania	  became	  the	  
last	  state	  to	  enact	  anti-­‐discrimination	  laws	  in	  1998.	  The	  International	  Convention	  on	  the	  
Elimination	  of	  all	  forms	  of	  Racial	  Discrimination,	  ratified	  by	  the	  General	  Assembly	  of	  the	  
United	  Nations	  in	  1965,	  permitted	  the	  undertaking	  of:	  	  
Special	  measures	  taken	  for	  the	  sole	  purpose	  of	  securing	  adequate	  advancement	  of	  
certain	  racial	  or	  ethnic	  groups	  or	  individuals	  requiring	  such	  protection	  as	  may	  be	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necessary	  in	  order	  to	  ensure	  such	  groups	  or	  individuals	  equal	  enjoyment	  or	  exercise	  
of	  human	  rights	  and	  fundamental	  freedoms	  shall	  not	  be	  deemed	  racial	  
discrimination	  (United	  Nations	  1965).	  
Forty-­‐five	  years	  later,	  indigenous	  Australians	  still	  experience	  substantial	  discrimination.	  In	  a	  
UN	  report	  released	  in	  2010,	  ‘Situation	  of	  indigenous	  peoples	  in	  Australia,’	  there	  are	  still	  
concerns	  about	  ‘ongoing	  effects	  of	  historical	  racism’	  in	  Australia.	  The	  report	  notes	  that	  
‘additional	  efforts’	  are	  needed	  ‘to	  create	  a	  healthy	  environment	  conducive	  to	  the	  
enjoyment	  of	  rights	  and	  freedoms’	  for	  Indigenous	  Australians	  (Anaya	  2010:	  clause	  73).	  	  
David	  O	  Sears	  and	  P	  J	  Henry	  describe	  ‘symbolic	  racism’	  as	  a	  modern,	  less	  overt	  form	  of	  
racism	  where	  the	  presumption	  is	  that	  ‘Whites	  have	  become	  egalitarian	  in	  principle	  and	  …	  
new	  forms	  of	  prejudice,	  embodying	  both	  negative	  feelings	  toward	  Blacks	  as	  a	  group	  and	  
some	  conservative	  non-­‐racial	  values,	  have	  become	  politically	  dominant’	  (Sears	  &	  Henry	  
2003:	  259).	  Symbolic	  racism	  comprises	  of	  a	  political	  belief	  system	  that	  encompasses	  four	  
key	  principles:	  ‘(a)Blacks	  no	  longer	  face	  much	  prejudice	  or	  discrimination,	  (b)	  Blacks	  failure	  
to	  progress	  results	  from	  their	  unwillingness	  to	  work	  hard	  enough,	  (c)	  Blacks	  are	  demanding	  
too	  much	  too	  fast,	  and	  (d)	  Blacks	  have	  gotten	  more	  than	  they	  deserve’	  (Sears	  &	  Henry	  2003:	  
259).	  Symbolic	  racism	  often	  manifests	  in	  a	  society,	  according	  to	  Sears	  and	  Henry,	  through	  
opposition	  to	  racially	  targeted	  policy	  proposals	  (Sears	  &	  Henry	  2003:	  259).	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  
Bolt	  returns	  to	  symbolic	  racism	  in	  his	  discourse	  and	  his	  attempts	  to	  portray	  the	  
complainants	  as	  themselves	  racist.	  Such	  ‘turning	  the	  tables’	  is	  a	  classic	  tactic	  of	  the	  politics	  
of	  racial	  discrimination	  in	  Australia.	  
Media	  Racism:	  In	  good	  faith?	  
In	  a	  confusing	  op-­‐ed	  piece	  on	  the	  ABC’s	  blog	  site,	  The	  Drum,	  the	  host	  of	  the	  Media	  Watch	  
program,	  Jonathon	  Holmes,	  made	  comparisons	  between	  the	  Defamation	  Act	  (2005)	  and	  the	  
Racial	  Discrimination	  Act	  (1975)	  prompted	  by	  the	  Bromberg	  ruling.	  Holmes,	  proclaiming	  that	  
‘the	  [Racial	  Discrimination]	  act	  sets	  a	  disturbingly	  low	  bar,’	  described	  Justice	  Bromberg’s	  
comment	  that	  he	  was	  not	  satisfied	  that	  Bolt	  acted	  ‘reasonably	  and	  in	  good	  faith,’	  as	  
‘profoundly	  disturbing’	  for	  the	  future	  of	  freedom	  of	  speech	  in	  Australia	  (Holmes	  2011).	  
Holmes	  argued	  that	  the	  Aborigines	  named	  by	  Bolt	  in	  his	  column	  could	  have	  claimed	  to	  have	  
been	  defamed,	  and	  that	  Bolt,	  due	  to	  his	  ‘sloppy’	  research	  would	  not	  have	  succeeded	  with	  a	  
plea	  of	  truth	  and	  fair	  comment	  (Holmes	  2011).	  However,	  Holmes	  then	  contradicts	  himself	  
and	  states	  that	  Bolt	  should	  have	  been	  able	  to	  succeed	  with	  a	  fair	  comment	  defence	  against	  
defamation	  as	  it	  is	  enough,	  in	  Holmes	  opinion,	  ‘that	  Bolt	  honestly	  held	  the	  views	  he	  
outlined,	  and	  they	  are	  based	  on	  true	  facts’	  (Holmes	  2011).	  Holmes	  seems	  to	  be	  mounting	  a	  
non-­‐argument	  here.	  Justice	  Bromberg	  states	  that	  Part	  IIA	  of	  the	  Racial	  Discrimination	  Act	  is	  
‘concerned	  to	  protect	  the	  fundamental	  right	  of	  freedom	  of	  expression’	  ((Bromberg	  2011:	  
clause	  14).	  However,	  by	  including	  ‘errors	  of	  fact,	  distortions	  of	  the	  truth	  and	  inflammatory	  
and	  provocative	  language’	  in	  his	  articles,	  Bolt	  vetoed	  his	  right	  to	  claim	  that	  what	  he	  wrote	  
was	  fair	  comment	  under	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  Act	  (Bromberg	  2011:	  clause	  23).	  Why	  then,	  given	  
these	  errors	  and	  distortions,	  does	  Holmes	  believe	  that	  Bolt	  would	  have	  succeeded	  with	  a	  
fair	  comment	  defence	  if	  Eatock	  et	  al,	  had	  sued	  Bolt	  for	  defamation?	  And,	  as	  Justice	  
Bromberg	  wryly	  contends:	  ‘An	  expression	  of	  identity	  is	  itself	  an	  expression	  that	  freedom	  of	  
expression	  serves	  to	  protect’	  (Bromberg	  2011:	  423).	  Fairfax	  columnist	  David	  Marr	  is	  certain	  
that	  had	  the	  complainants	  decided	  to	  mount	  a	  defamation	  case,	  they	  would	  have	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succeeeded.	  He	  wryly	  comments	  that	  ‘the	  Herald	  Sun	  and	  its	  star	  journalist	  should	  be	  
thankful	  they're	  not	  facing	  nine	  separate	  defamation	  trials’	  (Marr	  2011).	  It	  is	  also	  worth	  
noting	  that	  the	  Defamation	  Act	  and	  The	  Racial	  Discrimination	  Act	  were	  designed	  for	  
different	  purposes.	  Defamtion	  law	  concerns	  the	  protection	  of	  reputation	  from	  ill-­‐meaning	  
imputation.	  The	  Racial	  Discrimination	  Act	  was	  introduced	  as	  part	  of	  Australia’s	  commitment	  
at	  having	  signed	  the	  International	  Convention	  of	  the	  Elimination	  of	  All	  forms	  of	  Racial	  
Discrimination.	  The	  key	  provision	  of	  section	  18C,	  introduced	  in	  1995,	  does	  not	  state	  that	  it	  is	  
unlawful	  to	  offend	  another	  person	  or	  a	  group;	  it	  states	  that	  it	  is	  unlawful	  if	  the	  offending	  act	  
is	  done	  ‘because	  of	  the	  race,	  colour	  or	  national	  or	  ethnic	  origin	  of	  the	  other	  person	  or	  all	  of	  
the	  people	  in	  the	  group’.	  
Quoting	  from	  the	  scriptures…Bolt	  wounded	  by	  friendly	  fire	  
It	  wasn’t	  just	  fellow	  Murdoch	  hacks	  who	  came	  to	  Bolt’s	  defence;	  former	  Howard	  
government	  minister,	  David	  Kemp	  argued	  in	  The	  Australian	  that	  section	  18C	  of	  the	  Racial	  
Discrimination	  Act	  is	  ‘contrary	  to	  the	  principle	  of	  freedom	  of	  speech	  that	  underpins	  our	  
democracy’.	  He	  went	  on	  in	  strong	  language	  to	  describe	  the	  process	  by	  which	  Bolt	  was	  found	  
to	  have	  breached	  the	  act	  ‘obscene	  in	  the	  full	  meaning	  of	  the	  words:	  offensive,	  loathsome,	  
ill-­‐omened,	  disgusting’.	  Like	  many	  conservatives	  who	  rallied	  to	  Bolt’s	  side,	  Kemp	  claimed,	  
without	  mounting	  much	  of	  an	  argument	  that	  the	  RDA	  ‘must	  be	  abolished	  as	  soon	  as	  
possible’	  (Kemp	  2011).	  
Kemp	  quotes	  from	  philosopher	  John	  Stuart	  Mill’s	  famous	  1859	  essay,	  On	  Liberty,	  to	  defend	  
his	  argument:	  ‘the	  free	  expression	  of	  all	  opinions	  should	  be	  permitted,	  on	  condition	  that	  the	  
manner	  be	  temperate,	  and	  do	  not	  pass	  the	  bounds	  of	  fair	  discussion’	  (Kemp	  2011).	  What	  
Kemp	  omitted	  was	  that	  Mill	  also	  argued	  against	  ‘the	  tyranny	  of	  the	  majority’	  over	  the	  
minority,	  asserting	  that	  it	  was:	  
[A]	  social	  tyranny	  more	  formidable	  than	  many	  kinds	  of	  political	  oppression	  …	  it	  
leaves	  fewer	  means	  of	  escape,	  penetrating	  much	  more	  deeply	  into	  the	  details	  of	  life,	  
and	  enslaving	  the	  soul	  itself	  …	  there	  needs	  protection	  also	  against	  the	  tyranny	  of	  the	  
prevailing	  opinion	  and	  feeling;	  against	  the	  tendency	  of	  society	  to	  impose,	  by	  other	  
means	  than	  civil	  penalties,	  its	  own	  ideas	  and	  practices	  as	  rules	  of	  conduct	  on	  those	  
who	  dissent	  from	  them	  (Mill	  1989:	  8).	  
Another	  former	  Howard	  Government	  minister,	  Kevin	  Andrews,	  now	  Member	  for	  Menzies,	  
claimed	  in	  yet	  another	  op-­‐ed	  piece	  in	  The	  Australian,	  that	  the	  Bolt	  case	  highlighted	  ‘the	  
dangers	  that	  flow	  from	  the	  assertion	  of	  group	  rights,’	  ignoring	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  case	  against	  
Bolt	  was	  brought	  by	  an	  individual,	  Pat	  Eatock	  (Andrews	  2011).	  Summoning	  John	  Locke’s	  
1689	  Letter	  Concerning	  Toleration	  as	  evidence,	  Andrews	  proposes	  that	  Locke’s	  argument	  for	  
the	  separation	  of	  church	  and	  state—‘No	  person	  shall	  be	  compelled	  to	  support	  any	  religious	  
worship,	  but	  all	  persons	  shall	  be	  free	  to	  profess	  their	  religious	  opinions’—has	  been	  
extended,	  in	  an	  example	  of	  the	  ‘new	  moral	  relativism’	  to	  encompass	  ‘cultural	  identity	  and	  
multiculturalism’	  (Andrews	  2011).	  However,	  Andrews	  must	  distort	  the	  case	  in	  order	  to	  make	  
his	  point.	  ‘	  A	  claim	  is	  made	  for	  example,	  that	  the	  expression	  of	  a	  moral	  judgment	  about	  the	  
beliefs,	  statements	  or	  actions	  of	  another	  group	  should	  be	  unlawful	  because	  it	  is	  offensive	  to	  
members	  of	  the	  group	  or	  that	  it	  is	  likely	  to	  insult	  that	  group’.	  Here	  racially	  motivated	  
slanders	  are	  recast	  as	  an	  ‘expression’	  of	  Bolt’s	  ‘moral	  judgment’	  and	  therefore	  sould	  be	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above	  legal	  sanction.	  Andrews	  also	  joins	  the	  Greek	  chorus	  clamouring	  for	  the	  RDA	  to	  be	  
amended	  or	  abolished:	  
	  Laws	  that	  enable	  groups,	  rather	  than	  individuals,	  to	  assert	  rights	  should	  be	  repealed	  
before	  we	  head	  further	  down	  this	  dangerous	  path	  (Andrews	  2011).	  
This	  is	  an	  interesting	  restatement	  of	  classic	  bourgeois	  individualism,	  but	  the	  irony	  is	  lost	  on	  
Andrews.	  Groups	  have	  rights	  in	  contemporary	  capitalist	  society;	  particularly	  groups	  of	  
wealthy	  and	  priviledged	  former	  Government	  ministers	  who	  claim	  a	  travel	  allowance	  and	  
generous	  (self-­‐awarded)	  pension	  benefits.	  However,	  the	  point	  here	  is	  not	  to	  poke	  easy	  fun	  
at	  Kevin	  Andrews.	  The	  point	  is	  that	  Andrews	  also	  distorts	  (by	  selective	  quoting)	  the	  meaning	  
of	  Locke’s	  message.	  Locke	  ended	  his	  Letter	  by	  declaring	  (in	  a	  passage	  omitted	  by	  Andrews)	  
that	  ‘no	  opinions	  contrary	  to	  human	  society,	  or	  to	  those	  moral	  laws	  which	  are	  necessary	  to	  
the	  preservation	  of	  civil	  society,	  are	  to	  be	  tolerated’	  (Locke	  2003:	  244).	  Surely	  then,	  under	  
Locke’s	  argument,	  Section	  18C	  of	  the	  Racial	  Discrimination	  Act	  outlawing	  racial	  vilification	  is	  
an	  example	  of	  a	  moral	  law	  ‘necessary	  to	  the	  preservation	  of	  civil	  society’?	  
This	  point	  is	  affirmed	  by	  Justice	  Bromberg’s	  deliberate	  mention	  of	  the	  rhetoric	  employed	  by	  
Bolt	  in	  the	  two	  original	  articles.	  Bromberg	  pointed	  to	  Bolt’s	  ‘liberal	  use	  of	  sarcasm	  and	  
mockery,’	  noting	  its	  ‘capacity	  to	  convey	  implications	  beyond	  the	  literal	  meaning	  of	  the	  
words	  used’	  (Bromberg	  2011).	  In	  the	  same	  vein,	  J.S.	  Mill	  also	  drew	  attention	  to	  the	  
hegemonic	  capacity	  of	  language:	  
With	  regard	  to	  what	  is	  commonly	  meant	  by	  intemperate	  discussion,	  namely,	  
invective,	  sarcasm,	  personality,	  and	  the	  like	  …	  whatever	  mischief	  arise	  from	  their	  
use,	  is	  greatest	  when	  they	  are	  employed	  against	  the	  comparatively	  defenceless	  …	  
the	  worst	  offence	  of	  this	  kind	  which	  can	  be	  committed	  by	  a	  polemic,	  is	  to	  stigmatize	  
those	  who	  hold	  the	  contrary	  opinion	  …	  unmeasured	  vituperation	  employed	  on	  the	  
side	  of	  the	  prevailing	  opinion,	  really	  does	  deter	  people	  from	  confessing	  contrary	  
opinions,	  and	  from	  listening	  to	  those	  who	  profess	  them	  (Mill	  1989:	  35-­‐6).	  
We	  would	  argue	  that	  detering	  people	  from	  ‘confessing	  contrary	  opinions’	  and	  ‘listening	  to	  
those	  who	  profess	  them’	  was	  entirely	  Bolt’s	  purpose	  in	  the	  offending	  columns.	  You	  either	  
accept	  that	  there	  is	  a	  need	  in	  a	  democratic	  society	  to	  protect	  citizens	  from	  racial	  vilification	  
or	  you	  do	  not.	  	  
Conclusion:	  Who	  decide’s	  what	  is	  ‘acceptable	  journalism’	  
These	  attempts	  to	  justify	  Bolt’s	  words	  and	  then	  to	  attack	  the	  Federal	  Court	  decision	  
ultimately	  fail	  because	  of	  their	  own	  internal	  insincerity	  and	  the	  self-­‐serving	  rhetoric	  they	  
employ.	  Justice	  Bromberg’s	  ruling	  is	  distorted;	  attempts	  are	  made	  to	  portray	  	  Bolt	  as	  the	  
victim	  of	  political	  correctness	  and	  the	  import	  of	  his	  intemperate	  language	  is	  hosed	  down	  in	  
an	  attempt	  to	  make	  it	  into	  some	  innocuous	  statement	  of	  personal	  ‘moral’	  belief.	  
However,	  Bolt’s	  carefully	  chosen	  attack	  was	  not	  innocuous;	  by	  his	  own	  admission	  he	  is	  a	  
culural	  warrior	  for	  Australia’s	  conservatives.	  He	  knew	  full	  well	  that	  his	  attack	  on	  ‘pale	  
skinned’	  Aborigines	  would	  act	  as	  a	  form	  of	  dog	  whistle	  politics	  to	  a	  key	  section	  of	  Herald	  Sun	  
readers.	  Bolt’s	  plaintive	  cry	  ‘I	  am	  not	  a	  racist’,	  carries	  with	  it,	  like	  so	  many	  utterances	  of	  this	  
phrase	  a	  	  very	  big	  ‘but’.	  In	  this	  case	  it’s	  ‘I’m	  not	  a	  racist’…but,	  these	  Aboriginal	  people	  are	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taking	  things	  they	  don’t	  deserve	  (and	  so	  on).	  Bolt’s	  columns	  were	  offensive;	  not	  just	  to	  
those	  named	  and	  shamed	  either.	  Many	  people	  find	  his	  rhetoric	  and	  discourse	  offensive.	  
That	  is	  Bolt’s	  ‘schtick’	  and	  it	  is	  a	  form	  of	  literary	  bullying.	  
But	  what	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  ‘free	  speech’	  argument:	  have	  Bolt’s	  rights	  been	  taken	  away	  from	  
him?	  Michael	  Gawenda	  added	  his	  comments	  to	  the	  debate	  declaring	  that	  ‘Bolt’s	  offence	  …	  
should	  not	  have	  been	  judged	  by	  a	  judge	  under	  the	  Racial	  Discrimination	  Act.	  I	  don’t	  want	  
judges	  and	  lawyers	  deciding	  what	  is	  acceptable	  journalism	  and	  what	  isn’t’	  (Gawenda	  2011).	  	  
But	  this	  misses	  the	  point	  on	  several	  levels.	  The	  first,	  as	  we’ve	  argued,	  is	  that	  the	  RDA	  is	  a	  
legislative	  public	  good	  that	  is	  in	  place	  to	  prevent	  forms	  of	  hate	  speech	  and	  the	  incitement	  of	  
racism.	  It	  is	  in	  the	  broad	  public	  interest	  that	  such	  laws	  exist.	  They	  are	  not	  perfect	  and	  
probably	  can	  never	  be	  so,	  but	  they	  are	  an	  important	  defence	  against	  deliberate	  and	  
politically-­‐motivated	  racist	  attacks	  on	  minorities.	  
Secondly,	  Bolt’s	  columns	  can	  hardly	  qualify	  as	  ‘journalism’,	  except	  at	  the	  broadest	  and	  most	  
basic	  level;	  they	  appear	  in	  a	  newspaper	  and	  in	  other	  news-­‐like	  environments.	  There	  was	  
little	  or	  no	  good	  research	  involved	  (which	  even	  Bolt	  admits);	  there	  were	  no	  interviews	  and	  
there	  is	  hardly	  a	  news	  point	  to	  be	  made	  in	  either	  piece.	  
Finally,	  the	  Blomberg	  ruling	  does	  not	  make	  a	  point	  about	  good	  or	  bad	  journalism	  or	  about	  
what	  is	  acceptable	  as	  journalism.	  It	  rules	  on	  the	  expression	  of	  opinion	  and	  the	  court	  found	  
that	  the	  form	  of	  the	  expression	  would	  cause	  harm.	  
The	  judgement	  about	  what	  is	  ‘acceptable	  journalism	  and	  what	  isn’t’	  is	  made	  in	  the	  first	  
instance	  by	  Bolt’s	  peers	  and	  secondly	  in	  the	  court	  of	  public	  opinion.	  
What’s	  clear	  in	  the	  Bolt	  case	  is	  that	  the	  editors	  and	  lawyers	  at	  the	  Herald	  and	  Weekly	  Times	  
should	  have	  made	  their	  own	  judgement	  before	  publication.	  It	  is	  clear	  in	  this	  case	  that	  a	  poor	  
decision	  was	  made.	  It	  was	  made	  either	  because	  Andrew	  Bolt	  is	  such	  a	  drawcard	  that	  he	  has	  
celebrity	  status	  and	  no	  one	  is	  game	  to	  stand	  up	  to	  him	  inside	  the	  Herald	  Sun,	  or	  it	  was	  made	  
because	  the	  senior	  editors	  on	  the	  paper	  (and	  across	  News	  Limited	  generally)	  believe	  that	  
they	  are	  on	  a	  mission	  to	  correct	  what	  they	  perceive	  as	  social	  evils.	  
Either	  way,	  publication	  of	  the	  columns	  has	  proved	  to	  be	  a	  mistake	  but	  it	  would	  be	  a	  foolish	  
person	  who	  put	  money	  on	  the	  notion	  that	  Bolt	  or	  ‘the	  Hun’	  have	  changed	  their	  ways.	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